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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the valuation effects of a legislative shock to employee
litigation rights, as well as the mediating effects of pre-existing employee rights.
The first chapter examines the valuation effects of the Passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act, an act that increases employee litigation rights related to demographic-based
discriminatory compensation filings. We find that firms with relatively fewer women in their
workforce exhibit a significant negative three-day abnormal return of 0.61% around the passage
of the Lilly Act. In contrast, we find that firms with relatively more women in their workforce do
not exhibit a significant abnormal return. Additionally, firms with lower female representation
exhibit larger increases in their implied cost of capital and larger decreases in their expected cash
flow compared to firms with high female representation. We do not find differences in market
reactions or analyst forecasts based on differences in racial diversity in the workforce. We interpret
our results as a response to perceived increases in litigation risk.
The second chapter further explores whether pre-existing employee rights, proxied by
union power, moderate or exacerbate the valuation effects of the passage of the Lilly Act. We find
that firms with relatively more union power exhibit a significant negative three-day abnormal
return of 1.12% around the passage of the Lilly Act. Firms with relatively lower union power on
the other hand do not exhibit a significant abnormal return. Further analysis shows that although
union power does not affect changes in the implied cost of capital or expected cash flows, firms
located in non-right-to-work states, states with more employee rights, exhibit significantly larger
increases in their implied cost of capital. We interpret our results as evidence that markets associate
stronger pre-existing employee rights with larger increases in perceived litigation risk around the
passage of the Lilly Act.
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CHAPTER 1: EMPLOYEE DIVERSITY AND LITIGATION RISK: EVIDENCE FROM
THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT

1.1. INTRODUCTION
It is well established that U.S. corporations face substantial litigation risk and the extant
literature has shown that corporate litigation events negatively influence firm profitability and
value through a variety of channels, such as reductions in capital expenditures and increases in
firm-specific risk (Arena and Julio, 2015; Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998; Karpoff and Lott, 1993;
McTier and Wald, 2011; Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs, 2009; Unsal, 2019; Unsal and Rayfield,
2019a, 2019b). However, most of this literature uses firm-specific litigation events, such as
employee and security-based lawsuits against the firm, to come to these conclusions. A different
stream of literature investigates the effects of universal demand laws and their legislative
introduction.1 However, these studies focus on the effects of an increase in agency conflicts that
stem from a reduction in shareholder rights rather than the effects of a potential change in litigation
costs (Appel, 2019; Chung, Kim, Rabarison, To, and Wu, 2020; Houston, Lin, and Xie, 2018;
Nguyen, Phan, and Lee, 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018). Since both agency conflicts and litigation costs
could influence firm value, our study investigates a legislative event that increases litigation risk
without affecting shareholder rights to investigate the valuation effects of litigation risk increases,
solely.
To be specific, our study investigates investor and analyst reactions to a market-wide
increase in firm litigation risk by analyzing the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
(henceforth referred to as the Lilly Act). The Lilly Act overturned a previous Supreme Court
ruling, making it so that each discriminatory paycheck now renews the 180-day window in which

1 Universal demand laws require shareholders to seek approval from the board of directors and allow corrective action

to be taken prior to the initiation of a derivative lawsuit. Note that these requests are rarely approved because derivative
lawsuits often name directors as defendants, therefore greatly reducing shareholders’ litigation rights (Appel, 2019;
Ni and Yin, 2018).
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employees can file against a firm, effectively increasing employees’ litigation rights and firms’
employee litigation risk. Using this particular event has two major benefits. First, as mentioned
earlier, unlike universal demand laws, the Lilly Act serves as an exogenous shock to firm litigation
risk, independent from a shock to shareholder litigation rights, which are known to affect firm
decisions and the cost of capital through a change in agency conflicts (Houston et al., 2018;
Nguyen et al., 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018). Second, endogeneity from self-selection bias and reverse
causality is not an issue since the Lilly Act is a federal law that applies to all US firms
simultaneously.
Although the passage of the Lilly Act is a market-wide event, it may affect firms’ litigation
risk to varying degrees. This study focuses on the role that employee demographics play in this
dynamic. The extant accounting and finance literature on diversity tends to focus on the role of
CEO gender and top-executive gender diversity (Adhikari, Agrawal, and Malm, 2015; Joo,
Lawrence, and Parhizgari, 2020; Liu, 2018).2 While these studies have shown that diversity among
a firm’s leadership can reduce specific types of litigation, to our knowledge, no literature examines
the role of employee demographics outside of top management, despite the fact that any employee
can file a discrimination claim against his or her employer. On the one hand, firms would face both
a higher probability (and cost) of discrimination-based litigation as the group of employees they
discriminate against increases in size. On the other hand, as a group increases in size and becomes
more powerful, firms may have incentives to reduce or eliminate discriminatory practices against
these groups. Our investigation of the Lilly Act allows us to determine which of these two forces
prevails.
Our paper critically depends on the idea that the Lilly Act increases perceived litigation
risk. We believe that it does, as prior to the Lilly Act, employees were required to file an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) questionnaire within 180 days of the initial
2

(Gender) diversity is an important research topic, as evidenced by a recent special issues in the Journal of Corporate
Finance (2021). See, for example, Girardone, Kokas, and Wood (2021), Cardillo, Onali, and Torluccio (2021),
Karavitis, Kokas, and Tsoukas (2021), Arnaboldi, Casu, Gallo, Kalotychou, and Sarkisyan (2021), and Schopohl,
Urquhart, and Zhang (2021).
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compensation discrimination. Effectively, this meant that if an employee discovered that they had
been receiving discriminatory pay 181 days after their first discriminatory paycheck, the employee
would be ineligible to file an EEOC questionnaire.3 This idea was judicially agreed upon by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 2007. However, in 2009 then President Obama signed an executive order,
referred to as the Lilly Act, in which firms potentially could be sued for pay discrimination within
a 180-day renewing window around each wage payment. Hence, the passage of the Lilly Act
served as a large shock to litigation risk.4 Potential evidence that this indeed was the case is
provided by Unsal and Hassan (2019) who report a large spike in discrimination-based employee
lawsuits in 2009.
In addition to using employee demographics, along with the Lilly Act as a novel
experimental setting, to investigate litigation risk, this study is also important from a
socio-economic perspective. Diversity has become a social hot-button topic (Elks, 2020; Los
Angeles Times, 2020; Rowley, 2020; Roy, 2017; Sauer, 2020), with some disputes ending in
settlement payouts exceeding $20,000,000 (“EEOC v. LA Weight Loss”, 2008; “Tucker v.
Walgreen Company”, 2008). Our investigation into the value effects of the Lilly Act may provide
some insights into whether indirectly mandated diversity influences the economic value of firms.
We first investigate the valuation effects for our sample firms. The results show that for
our sample of 2,680 firms, the average abnormal return surrounding the date of passage for the
Lilly Act is close to zero. This is as expected since the Lilly Act is a market-wide shock that affects
all firms. However, when we split the sample by the percentage of female workers within the firm,
we find significant differences. For firms with low female representation, we find significantly
negative abnormal returns. These abnormal returns are also economically significant at -0.61%

3

This 180-day statute of limitations applies to both current and former employees wishing to file an EEOC
questionnaire.
4 Although the Lilly Act had a retroactive provision, the increase in litigation risk likely stems from new cases. This
is because retroactive cases that were no longer active or still within the window for appeals often could not be
reopened (National Women's Law Center, 2011).
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over a three-day period. We do not find that firms with relatively more female representation are
economically affected by the introduction of the Lilly Act.
Further, we investigate the channels through which low female representation influences
firm value and find that firms with low female representation exhibit larger increases in their
implied cost of capital and greater decreases in their forecasted cash flow after the passing of the
Lilly Act when compared to firms with high female representation. When the sample is split by
firm size, we find that larger firms tend to experience negative abnormal returns while smaller
firms experience positive abnormal returns. This could suggest that the market anticipates that
larger firms are more likely to be targeted by discrimination-based lawsuits, which is in line with
findings from both Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005) and Jones and Weingram (1996). We also find
that firms with fewer cash holdings experience negative abnormal returns, possibly because
cash-scarce firms are less able to absorb the blow of a lawsuit. Interestingly, we fail to find
evidence supporting the notion that racial make-up affects firm value around the passage of the
Lilly Act.
This study improves upon the extant litigation literature by examining a market-wide
legislative event that increases litigation risk, independent of an increase in agency conflicts, and
affirms that markets respond to changes in perceived litigation risk. Further, this paper also
provides socio-economic insight by investigating the valuation effects of employee diversity
beyond the traditional top-executive and board diversity measures that are often explored in the
existing literature.
The plan of our paper is as follows. In section 2, we will review the related literature and
discuss the Lilly Act in more detail. Section 3 will describe our sample and data collection process.
Section 4 presents our results followed by various robustness tests in Section 5. Finally, section 6
will conclude.

4

1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE LILLY ACT
1.2.1 LITIGATION AND LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Due to court costs, loss of reputation, and pulls on management’s time and resources,
corporate lawsuits often play a role in various corporate decisions, such as equity issuances, capital
structure, and firm governance (Arena and Ferris, 2017). Since firms must pay for litigation costs
but are unlikely to generate benefits from litigation events, it is not surprising that these events
appear to have a negative impact on firm performance and valuation (Arena and Ferris, 2017). For
instance, several studies show an increase in litigation events leads to higher firm-specific risk
(McTier and Wald, 2011; Unsal, 2019; Unsal and Rayfield, 2019b). This occurs through a variety
of channels, such as decreased profitability, cash payouts, and capital expenditures as well as
increased cash holdings and takeover risk (Arena and Julio, 2015; McTier and Wald, 2011;
Murphy et al., 2009; Unsal, 2019; Unsal and Rayfield, 2019a, 2019b).
Given that corporate litigation leads to higher firm-specific risk, reduced profitability, and
a higher likelihood of being acquired, the market is likely to react negatively to increases in
litigation risk. However, the literature in this area has predominantly focused on litigation events
(Bhagat et al., 1998; Ellert, 1976; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Lowry and Shu, 2002; Malm and
Krolikowski, 2017) while overlooking legislative events, which could influence the occurrence
and outcome of future litigation events. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these studies provide
evidence that the market reacts negatively to various litigation events (Arena and Ferris, 2017;
Bhagat et al., 1998; Karpoff and Lott, 1993). A few studies further attempt to gauge the market’s
ability to anticipate future lawsuits, such as those by Gande and Lewis (2009) and Klock (2015).
Both of these studies provide evidence that shareholders partially anticipate lawsuits by showing
that firms tend to experience negative abnormal returns in the weeks leading up to their case filing
date.5 While each of these studies provides insight into how the market reacts to corporate lawsuits,
they do not examine whether investors react to a sudden change in litigation risk.

5

The filing date must occur after the accused crime took place.
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The stream of literature that comes closest to examining the market value effects of a
change in litigation risk caused by a change in legislation is the universal demand laws literature.
Universal demand laws require shareholders to seek approval from the board of directors and allow
corrective action to be taken prior to the initiation of a derivative lawsuit. However, these requests
are rarely approved because derivative lawsuits often name directors as defendants, greatly
reducing shareholders’ litigation rights (Appel, 2019; Ni and Yin, 2018). Due to this reduction in
shareholder litigation rights, the market effects of this change in legislation stems not only from a
reduction in litigation costs but also from an increase in agency conflicts (Chung et al., 2020;
Houston et al., 2018; Nguyen et al., 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018; Wilson, 2020). This makes it difficult
to separate the value effects caused by changes in litigation costs from those caused by changes in
agency conflicts. Rather than using a legislative event that impacts shareholder litigation risk, we
examine a legislative event that affects employee litigation rights. Since non-executive employees
are not a source of corporate governance, while shareholders are, we posit that a change in
legislation affecting employee litigation rights will not have a significant impact on agency
conflicts (Gillan, 2006).
1.2.2 EMPLOYEE DEMOGRAPHICS
As mentioned in the introduction, (gender) diversity is the subject of a large stream of
literature6, but the vast majority of this literature tends not to relate diversity with litigation risk.
And, while the litigation risk literature on gender diversity among top management is scarce, the
litigation risk literature for both racial diversity in top management and overall employee
demographics is virtually non-existent. Regarding top management, Joo et al. (2020) show that
shareholder litigation is inversely related to the proportion of female independent directors while
two papers by Liu (2018) and Adhikari et al. (2015) show a similar relationship with various other

6

Girardone, Kokas, and Wood (2021) provide a nice overview of some of these papers.
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lawsuit filings.7 Further, Liu (2018) finds that board gender diversity and having a female CEO
act as substitutes in regards to reducing environmental litigation. Although these findings show
that gender diversity among a firm’s leadership can reduce various types of litigation, they do not
examine the role of employee demographics outside of top management.
1.2.3 LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
The Lilly Act presents a change in litigation risk for all firms across the US. In 2007, the
Supreme Court ruled against Lilly Ledbetter in her case against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
Inc. This ruling made it so that employees were required to file a discriminatory pay charge within
180 days of the initial pay discrimination. Any future payments were assumed to be partly based
on the initial payment and were therefore not a direct act of discrimination. This is best explained
by the following excerpt from "Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc" (2007):
“Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly
discriminatory employment decision was made and communicated to her. Her
attempt to shift forward the intent associated with prior discriminatory acts to the
1998 pay decision is unsound, for it would shift intent away from the act that
consummated the discriminatory employment practice to a later act not performed
with bias or discriminatory motive, imposing liability in the absence of the requisite
intent.”

7 Liu (2018) looks at environmental lawsuit filings while Adhikari et al. (2015) look at filings related to environmental,

product liability, medical liability, contract, intellectual property, securities, labor/pension, and miscellaneous
violations.
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After eighteen months, this ruling was overturned when Barack Obama signed his first
piece of legislature on January 29, 2009, the Lilly Act.8 The Lilly Act provided amendments to
various employment equality legislations, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
most noticeable impact of the Lilly Act was that it overturned the supreme courts’ ruling from
"Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc" (2007), stating that each paycheck that contains
discriminatory compensation is considered to be a separate violation, resetting the 180-day statute
of limitation.9 This can be found in both sections three and four of the "Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009" (2009):
“For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with
respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an
individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or
other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or
other practice.”

Thus, the Lilly Act broadens the window for employees to file claims of discriminatory
compensation and effectively increases firms’ perceived chance of litigation. Additionally, given
that the Lilly Act enhances the litigation rights of employees, not shareholders, its effect is not
contaminated by potential changes in agency costs. By analyzing the firm valuation effects of this

8

The bill passed the Senate with 61 votes (58 required) on January 22nd, and the House with 250 votes (212
required) on January 27th.
9 When the Lilly Act was passed, the supreme courts’ original ruling had already been cited by federal judges in
more than 300 cases (Pear, 2009).
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federal regulation aimed at increasing equality, this study may shed light on both the ongoing
equality and fairness debate as well as help clarify the role of employee demographics with respect
to perceived discrimination-based litigation risk.
1.3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION
This study uses employee demographic data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
along with business segment, stock return, and financial data from the CRSP/Compustat Merged
(CCM) database. Analyst forecast data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) is
also used to further analyze the channels through which changes in value occur. Beginning with
all 6,098 publicly traded firms listed in the CCM database from 2008 through 2009, we first
remove non-domestic firms, reducing our sample to 4,774 firms. Next, we filter out firms with
insufficient accounting data from the 3,779 firms whose fiscal year ends in December or January,
leaving 3,041 firms remaining. To calculate each firm’s cumulative abnormal return, we also
require that each firm have a minimum of 70 daily observations available during the estimation
period, further reducing the sample to 2,774 firms. We then require that each firm can be linked to
the employee diversity data from the BLS, further reducing the sample to 2,689. Lastly, we require
that each firm be headquartered in the US, leaving a final sample of 2,680. Table 1 provides a
summary of the sample selection process.

9

Table 1.1: Sample Selection
CRSP/Compustat Merged Firms
Domestic Firms with Share Code 10 or 11
Fiscal Year-End in December or January
All Accounting Data Available
70 or More Estimation Period Observations
Employee Diversity Data Available
Incorporated and Headquartered in the US

6,098
4,774
3,779
3,041
2,774
2,689
2,680

This table displays the sample selection process. We begin with all CRSP/Compustat Merged firms from 2008 to
2009. Then we eliminate non-domestic firms and firms whose fiscal years do not end in December or January. To
calculate cumulative abnormal returns and ensure that all of the necessary control variables are available, we remove
firms with incomplete accounting data and firms with fewer than 70 estimation period observations. We then remove
firms that we are unable to match to the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Lastly, we remove firms that are not both
incorporated and headquartered within the US.

The BLS data provides a breakdown of over 300 industries’ employee demographics,
including the average percentage of women and minority employees within each industry.10 Based
on Passel and Rohal’s (2015) report on the impact of immigration on demographics in the US,
which shows that national demographics remained similar between 2005 and 2015,11 we assume
that industry employee demographics remain more or less similar from 2008 to 2011. Using this
assumption, we use the 2011 BLS demographic data to proxy for industry-level employee
demographics at the end of 2008. To pair each firm with its respective demographics data, we first
match each BLS industry to a 2-digit, 3-digit, and/or 4-digit SIC code. Then, assuming the
demographic composition of a business segment is at industry average, we match each segment of
sample firms to a BLS industry by the segment’s primary SIC code, to obtain the demographics of
that segment. Lastly, each firm-level demographic variable is calculated as the weighted average
of segment-level demographics, using the segment sales as weights. For example, 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 is
calculated as follows:
𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖

(1)

∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑘

10

The earliest demographic data available on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website is from 2011
(https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2011/cpsaat18.htm).
11 Figure 2.5 in their paper shows that Hispanic (Asian) Americans make up an additional 3% (1%) of the total U.S.
population in 2015 (compared to 2005), while Caucasian Americans make up 4% less of the total US population.
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Where 𝑘 represents each business segment within firm 𝑖, 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 is the percentage of women
employees, and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is gross sales.12 Although not all firms have multiple business segments,
using the firm-level demographic variables improves the granularity of our data for 24% of our
sample firms.
To study how investors react to a nationwide legislative event that increases litigation risk,
we use event study methodology to observe the market’s three-day cumulative abnormal return
around the passing of the Lilly Act. We apply a market model, using value-weighted market
returns, including dividends, over the estimation period of 𝑡 = −260 to 𝑡 = −17, where 𝑡 = 0 is
January 29th, the day the Lilly Act was signed into law. We select this estimation window because
it covers all trading days from 2008 while excluding the trade days from January 2009. This is
important because the Lilly Act was reintroduced to Congress in early January of 2009, 13 being
brought to the Senate on January 8th.
We further analyze the channels through which value is expected to change by examining
how the Lilly Act affects investors’ required rate of return and analysts’ forecasts for cash flow.
Measuring required return with each firms’ implied cost of capital (ICOC), we investigate a
subsample of firms that have available information on the book value of equity, shares outstanding,
earnings, and dividends, as well as analysts’ 1-year and 2-year forecasts for earnings per share,
long-term growth forecasts, and concurrent share price. Using the residual income-based valuation
model from Claus and Thomas (2001), we then calculate the ICOC for a subsample of 803 firms.
Our cash flow variable is calculated as cash flow per share scaled by the share price to present
cash flow on a per-dollar basis.
To ensure that we are interpreting the effects of a change in litigation risk on firm value,
we introduce various firm-level controls to each of our models. The variable Cash Holdings is
equal to the firm’s cash holdings scaled by total assets, Log(Assets) is equal to the natural log of
total assets, Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and BTM is the book-to-market
12
13

𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is calculated in a similar manner.
The bill was initially rejected by the Senate in April 2008.
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ratio. We also follow Chen, Li, and Zou (2016) and Houston et al. (2018) by controlling for both
idiosyncratic (Idio) and systematic (Beta) risk, as well as price run-up (RunUp) and analyst
optimism (Analyst Opt). Both risk measures and price run-up are estimated using the market model
on daily returns over the twelve months leading up to the ICOC estimation, while analyst optimism
is calculated by subtracting the 1-year-ahead analysts’ forecasted earnings from the realized
1-year-ahead earnings and scaling it by the stock price one month prior to the forecast’s
announcement date. Price run-up is introduced to control for the fact that analyst forecasts may
not reflect information as quickly as the market, which could generate noise in both the firm's
expected future cash flow and ICOC. Similarly, since analyst forecasts are known to be optimistic
(Dreman and Berry, 1995; Hong and Kubik, 2003), the market could recognize this bias and
systematically adjust prices to compensate for it. Without a control for analyst optimism, our
accounting-based ICOC measure would be biased upwards. In addition to these firm-level
controls, we utilize state-fixed effects to address state-level differences, such as local laws and
practices.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. The mean (median) cumulative
abnormal return is -0.18% (-0.25%), but unsurprisingly, the mean is not significantly different
from zero, since the Lilly Act is a market-wide shock that affects all firms. Our mean (median)
ICOC is 12.58% (11.56%), with the first and third quartiles equal 9.04% to and 14.13%
respectively. Expected cash flow equal $0.25 ($0.11) per share dollar on average (median).
Women appear to make up 42% of our sample’s employees while racial minorities represent less
than 28% of the sample’s workforce. The mean (median) cash holdings for our sample is 12.67%
(5.25%) of total assets with the average firm owning more than 9.5 billion dollars’ worth of total
assets. Compared to the full CCM universe, our firms are slightly larger but have similar industry
distributions and profitability characteristics.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics

CAR
ICOC
eCF
Women (%)
Minority (%)
Cash Holdings
Log(Assets)
Leverage
BTM
Idio
Beta
RunUp
Analyst Opt

Obs
2,680
803
438
2,680
2,680
2,680
2,680
804
804
804
804
804
804

Mean
-0.0018
0.1258
0.2475
42.1368
27.6428
0.1267
6.5875
0.2080
0.6930
0.0226
1.0406
-0.1721
-0.0086

St.Dev.
0.0845
0.0859
1.7162
17.0824
6.8851
0.1695
2.0824
0.1856
0.4787
0.0083
0.3840
0.3857
0.0274

25th
-0.0398
0.0904
0.0743
28.5528
22.2980
0.0159
5.2015
0.0371
0.3731
0.0169
0.7755
-0.3882
-0.0123

Percentiles
50th
75th
0.0312
-0.0025
0.1413
0.1156
0.1438
0.1060
59.5739
38.7000
31.0475
29.1169
0.1680
0.0525
7.9041
6.6349
0.3246
0.1827
0.9056
0.6000
0.0272
0.0216
1.3024
1.0565
0.0418
-0.1524
0.0012
-0.0024

This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. CAR represents the three-day cumulative abnormal returns
around the passing of The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. ICOC is the implied cost of capital, calculated using
the residual income-based valuation model from Claus and Thomas (2001). eCF is the expected cash flow per share
scaled by the share price. Women represents the percentage of female workers employed. Minority represents the
percentage of workers belonging to a racial minority. Cash Holdings is firm cash holdings scaled by total assets.
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. Idio and Beta represent
unsystematic and systematic risk respectively and are estimated using the market model on daily returns over the
twelve months leading up to ICOC estimation. RunUp is also estimated using the market model and captures the fact
that analysts' forecasts may not incorporate information as quickly as the market. Analyst Opt equals the difference
between the actual 1-year-ahead earnings and 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price one month
prior to the forecasts announcement date and controls for bias in analyst forecasts.

1.4. RESULTS
1.4.1 VALUATION EFFECTS
Although our sample’s mean abnormal return is not significantly different from zero, when
the sample is partitioned by the percentage of women and minority employees, the market appears
to treat firms with high and low representation differently. We test whether these differences are
statistically significant by separating each group into high and low representation categories based
on whether their representation is above (High) or below (Low) the median representation for each
demographic. Table 3 shows that the differences in CAR between high and low representation
firms are both statistically and economically significant for both women and minorities.
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Table 1.3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
High
0.0016
Women
Mean
-0.0008
Median
0.0010
Minority
Mean
0.0007
Median
0.0041*
Cash Holdings
Mean
0.0010
Median
-0.0119***
Log(Assets)
Mean
-0.0085***
Median

Low
-0.0061***
-0.0052***
-0.0045**
-0.0043***
-0.0077***
-0.0045***
0.0083***
0.0058***

Diff.
0.0077**
0.0044**
0.0055*
0.0050**
0.0118***
0.0055***
-0.0202***
-0.0143***

p-value
0.0194
0.0131
0.0935
0.0107
0.0003
0.0015
0.0000
0.0000

This table displays the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns partitioned into above the median (High) and
below the median (Low) groupings based on the percentage of women employees (Women), the percentage of
employees belonging to a racial minority (Minority), cash holdings as a percentage of total assets (Cash Holdings),
and Log(Assets). The p-values are calculated using t-scores for differences between means and z-scores for differences
between medians.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

The most noticeable result is the negative market reaction of firms with low
women/minority representation since the cumulative abnormal returns for these groups are
negative and statistically different from zero. The cumulative abnormal returns of firms with high
representation, on the other hand, tend to be close to zero. For instance, the mean (median)
cumulative abnormal return of firms with low female representation is -0.61% (-0.52%) while
firms with high female representation have a mean (median) cumulative abnormal return of 0.16%
(-0.08%). Similarly, the mean (median) cumulative abnormal return of firms with low minority
representation is -0.45% (-0.43%), while firms with higher minority representation experience
mean (median) cumulative abnormal returns of 0.10% (0.07%).
In addition to being statistically significant, these differences are also economically
significant, with low female representation firms experiencing cumulative abnormal returns 0.77%
lower than high female representation firms. For the average firm in our sample, this would result
in a difference of over $20,000,000 in market value, with market value calculated as common
shares outstanding multiplied by the share price. Similarly, low minority representation firms,
experience 0.55% lower cumulative abnormal returns compared to high minority representation
firms. Our results also show that firms with fewer cash holdings also experience negative market
14

reactions, -0.77% on average, while those with above-median cash holdings experience abnormal
market reactions of 0.41%. Larger firms in our sample experience negative cumulative abnormal
returns of -1.19%, while smaller firms experience positive cumulative abnormal returns of 0.83%.
These differences are also economically significant, with firms holding more cash earning an
average of 1.18% higher cumulative abnormal returns than firms with lower cash holdings and
large firms experiencing 2.02% lower abnormal returns compared to small firms.
These initial results suggest that a high percentage of women and minority employees lead
to higher (or, perhaps, less negative) abnormal returns. This is consistent with the notion that higher
women or minority composition cuts down firms’ discriminatory tendencies. Similarly, cash
positions and firm size also play a significant role in determining market’s reaction to the change
in litigation risk brought about by Lilly Act.
Before testing whether these differences hold in a multivariate setting, we investigate the
correlations between our variables for potential multicollinearity issues. Table 4 presents the
correlation matrices, with Panel A showing the matrix for our full sample and Panel B displaying
a matrix for a subsample of firms with the necessary data for our valuation channel analyses.
Although most of the correlation coefficients in Panel A are statistically significant at the 5% level,
the largest coefficient, in terms of absolute value, is only 0.4690. Similarly, most of the correlation
coefficients in Panel B are weak, with one moderate correlation of -0.6032 between Log(Assets)
and Idio. Since our independent variables do not show any strong correlations to one another, our
regression results are unlikely to suffer from any multicollinearity issues.
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Table 1.4: Correlation Matrices
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns
Variables
(1)
(2)
(1) Women
(2) Minority
0.3573
(3) Cash Holdings
-0.0208
0.1564
(4) Log(Assets)
0.0180
-0.1493
Panel B: Valuation channels
Variables
(1)
(1) Women
(2) Minority
0.4455
(3) Log(Assets)
-0.0489
(4) Leverage
-0.1623
(5) BTM
0.0469
(6) Idio
0.1853
(7) Beta
0.0782
(8) RunUp
-0.2325
(9) Analyst Opt
-0.0904

(3)

-0.4690

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.1623
-0.1561
-0.0293
0.1710
0.1620
-0.2255
0.0034

0.1908
0.0154
-0.6032
-0.0403
0.1358
-0.0242

-0.0162
-0.1607
-0.1866
-0.0686
-0.0303

0.1291
0.0339
-0.2864
-0.3242

0.3910
-0.2588
-0.1178

-0.1172
-0.1039

0.2293

This table reports the correlation matrices for the full sample (Panel A) and the valuation channel subsample (Panel B). Women represents the percentage of women
workers employed. Minority represents the percentage of workers belonging to a racial minority. Cash Holdings represents firm cash holdings scaled by total
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and BTM is the book to market ratio. Idio and Beta represent idiosyncratic and systematic risk
respectively and are each estimated using the market model over 12 months of daily returns prior to the estimation of the implied cost of capital. RunUp is a control
for the time analysts take to incorporate information into their forecasts and is calculated using the market model and 12 months of daily returns prior to the
calculation of the implied cost of capital. Analyst Opt controls for analyst bias and is calculated as the 1-year-ahead analyst forecast less the 1-year ahead realized
earnings, scaled by the stock price one month prior to the forecast’s announcement date.
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Our initial multivariate tests are based on variations of the following ordinary least squares
regressions model:

𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ) +
∑50
𝑗=1 𝛼𝑗 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 + µ𝑖

(2)

Where 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm 𝑖 is located in state 𝑗 and zero
otherwise.
The first column of Table 5 shows that while controlling for cash holdings and total assets,
female representation is associated with higher CARs around the introduction of the Lilly Act,
while the second column suggests that minority representation does not significantly affect CARs
during the same window. In column (3), both female representation and minority representation
are included, along with controls for cash holdings and total assets, and provide similar results.14
Together, these regression results provide support for our initial findings by showing that the
percentage of women workers has a positive impact on abnormal returns across all models.
Economically, these results suggest that a firm with 10% higher female representation would
experience a 0.3% larger cumulative abnormal return around the introduction of the Lilly Act. For
the average firm in our sample, this is equal to a difference in market value of $8,002,435 over a
three-day period. All three models also provide evidence that cumulative abnormal returns around
the introduction of the Lilly Act are positively related to cash holdings and negatively related to
total assets. Two possible explanations for the lack of response to minority representation could
be that investors focus on women since 1) the narrative driving the Lilly Act was primarily focused
on women’s rights and 2) women make up a larger portion of the workforce (42.14%) compared
to minority employees (27.64%).

14

Untabulated results using logged Women and Minority variables to address the possibility of non-linearity show
similar results. These are available upon request.
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Table 1.5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Regressions
(1)
(2)
0.0002**
Women
(0.0464)
-0.0002
Minority
(0.3739)
0.0389***
0.0393***
Cash Holdings
(0.0065)
(0.0065)
-0.0036***
-0.0037***
Log(Assets)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
SFE
Yes
Yes
Obs
Adj. R-Squared

2,680
0.0240

2,680
0.0229

(3)
0.0003**
(0.0127)
-0.0004
(0.0943)
0.0408***
(0.0048)
-0.0038***
(0.0001)
Yes
2,680
0.0247

This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns regression results. The dependent variable, CAR, is represented
by the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the passing of The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Women
represents the percentage of women workers employed. Minority represents the percentage of workers belonging to a
racial minority. Cash Holdings represents firm cash holdings scaled by total assets. Log(Assets) represents the natural
log of total assets. SFE marks the inclusion of state dummy variables, each equal to 1 if the firm’s address is located
within the state and zero otherwise. We report the p-values, computed using robust standard errors, in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

1.4.2 ECONOMIC CHANNEL
Having established that female representation plays a role in cumulative abnormal returns
in both the univariate and multivariate setting, we delve into the channels through which valuation
changes occur. We do this by exploring the changes in the implied cost of capital and expected
cash flow around the introduction of the Lilly Act. To examine these relationships statistically, we
create two subsamples consisting of all firms with the necessary data to calculate the 2008 and
2009 values for each channel variable.15 Then, we examine the difference between the pre and post
Lilly Act periods both aggregated and disaggregated into above the median (High) and below the
median (Low) female representation firms.

While calculating the ICOC, we follow Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) by using the median analysts’
forecasts in June to ensure that all information from the previous fiscal year is publically available and incorporated
into the stock price at the time ICOC is estimated.
15
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Panel A of Table 6 shows that the implied cost of capital increased significantly after the
introduction of the Lilly Act for both high and low female representation firms. On average
(median), firms with high female representation experienced a 1.12% (0.78%) increase in the cost
of capital while low female representation firms experienced an increase of 4.35% (1.69%). A
Wilcoxon rank-sum test between these two changes shows that although both firms with high and
low female representation experienced an increase in their implied cost of capital, the median
difference of 0.91% between these two groups is both economically and statistically significant.
This suggests that high female representation firms experienced less severe increases in their
implied cost of capital compared to low female representation firms around the introduction of the
Lilly Act. Although the mean difference of 3.23% is economically significant, it is not statistically
significance with a p-value of 0.1116. Panel B of Table 6 shows a similar story for expected cash
flow.16 Although both high and low representation firms experienced a decrease in expected cash
flow, firms with high female representation experienced a $0.11 ($0.02) less severe decrease in
our cash flow variable on average (median) compared to low female representation firms.
However, similar to results for changes in the implied cost of capital, only the median difference
is statistically different from zero. Together, these results initially suggest that firms with low
female representation may lose value through both higher required rates of return and lower
expected cash flow.

16

The expected cash flow sample has 388 observations because 50 of our sample firms do not have expected cash
flow data for 2009.
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Table 1.6: Univariates for Valuation Channels
Panel A: Implied cost of capital
Pre
Mean
0.1258***
All
Median
0.1156***
Mean
0.1270***
High Women
N=416
Median
0.1186***
Mean
0.1247***
Low Women
N=387
Median
0.1090***
Mean Diff
Median Diff
Panel B: Expected cash flow per share
Pre
Mean
0.2630***
All
Median
0.1059***
Mean
0.1631***
High Women
N=204
Median
0.0951***
Mean
0.3568**
Low Women
N=184
Median
0.1130***

Post
0.1531***
0.1263***
0.1382***
0.1264***
0.1682***
0.1259***

Post
0.1887***
0.0832***
0.1438***
0.0834***
0.2309**
0.0828***

Mean Diff
Median Diff

Diff
0.0273***
0.0107***
0.0112***
0.0078***
0.0435**
0.0169***

p-value
0.0070
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0316
0.0000

-0.0323
-0.0091***

0.1116
0.0003

Diff
-0.0743*
-0.0227***
-0.0193***
-0.0117***
-0.1259
-0.0302***

p-value
0.0800
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1259
0.0000

0.1066
0.0185***

0.2088
0.0002

This table displays the mean and median implied cost of capital (Panel A) and expected cash flow (Panel B) partitioned
into above the median (High) and below the median (Low) groupings based on the percentage of female employees.
Each variable is also partitioned into pre-Lilly Act (Pre) and post-Lilly Act (Post) periods. The p-values are calculated
using t-scores for differences between means and z-scores for differences between medians.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

We further investigate the channels through which value is lost by running variations of
the two following ordinary least squares regression models:

∆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖 + ∑50
𝑗=1 𝛼𝑗 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 + µ𝑖

(3)

∆𝑒𝐶𝐹𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ) + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑖 + ∑50
𝑗=1 𝛼𝑗 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 + µ𝑖

(4)
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Where ∆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑖 is the change in the ICOC, calculated following the residual income-based
valuation model from Claus and Thomas (2001), from 2008 to 2009. Each of the demographic
variables, along with 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ), 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 , 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖 , and 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑖 are as described previously
in Section 3. ∆𝑒𝐶𝐹𝑖 represents the change in expected cash flow per share scaled by share price
from 2008 to 2009.
The results in Table 7 support our findings from Panel A of Table 6 by showing a negative
and statistically significant coefficient for 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 across all models. This suggests that firms
with higher female representation around the introduction of the Lilly Act experienced less severe
increases in their ICOC. Specifically, a firm with 10% more female representation would be
associated with a 0.20% smaller increase in their ICOC. Likewise, Panel B of Table 6 is supported
by the results in Table 8, which shows that female representation is positively and significantly
associated with changes in expected cash flow. Table 8 suggests that the change in expected cash
flow is $0.008 higher for every dollar of stock price for a firm with 10% higher female
representation.
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Table 1.7: Change in Implied Cost of Capital Regressions
(1)
(2)
-0.0002**
Women
(0.0309)
-0.0003
Minority
(0.2404)
0.0026**
0.0022**
Log(Assets)
(0.0105)
(0.0257)
0.0493***
0.0515***
Leverage
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
0.0023
0.0024
BTM
(0.5917)
(0.5780)
0.0100**
0.0113**
Beta
(0.0378)
(0.0218)
0.4961*
0.4202
Idio
(0.0890)
(0.1399)
0.0460***
0.0465***
RunUp
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
-0.1920*
-0.1836
Analyst Opt
(0.0961)
(0.1079)
SFE
Yes
Yes

(3)
-0.0002*
(0.0645)
-0.0001
(0.6409)
0.0025**
(0.0124)
0.0491***
(0.0000)
0.0022
(0.6059)
0.0103**
(0.0359)
0.4875*
(0.0924)
0.0457***
(0.0000)
-0.1903*
(0.0999)
Yes

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

803
0.3146

803
0.3153

803
0.3128

This table presents the change in the implied cost of capital, ∆ICOC, regression results around the passing of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Women represents the percentage of women workers employed. Minority represents
the percentage of workers belonging to a racial minority. Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets. Leverage is the
ratio of long-term debt to total assets and BTM is the book to market ratio. Idio and Beta represent idiosyncratic and
systematic risk respectively and are each estimated using the market model over 12 months of daily returns prior to
the estimation of the implied cost of capital. RunUp is a control for the time analysts take to incorporate information
into their forecasts and is calculated using the market model and 12 months of daily returns prior to the calculation of
the implied cost of capital. Analyst Opt controls for analyst bias and is calculated as the 1-year-ahead analyst forecast
less the 1-year ahead realized earnings, scaled by the stock price one month prior to the forecast’s announcement date.
SFE marks the inclusion of state dummy variables, each equal to 1 if the firm’s address is located within the state and
zero otherwise. We report the p-values, computed using robust standard errors, in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.8: Change in Expected Cash Flow Per Share Dollar Regressions
(1)
(2)
0.0008**
Women
(0.0405)
0.0006
Minority
(0.4246)
0.0005
-0.0000
Log(Assets)
(0.8340)
(0.9988)
-0.0189
-0.0209
Leverage
(0.4548)
(0.4099)
-0.0377**
-0.0399***
BTM
(0.0127)
(0.0084)
-0.0083
-0.0133
RunUp
(0.6734)
(0.4714)
SFE
Yes
Yes

(3)
0.0008**
(0.0260)
-0.0000
(0.9501)
0.0005
(0.8361)
-0.0192
(0.4471)
-0.0377**
(0.0131)
-0.0084
(0.6644)
Yes

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

388
0.1862

388
0.1886

388
0.1757

This table presents the change in expected cash flow, ∆eCF, regression results around the passing of the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009. Women represents the percentage of women workers employed. Minority represents the
percentage of workers belonging to a racial minority. Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets. Leverage is the
ratio of long-term debt to total assets and BTM is the book to market ratio. RunUp is a control for the time analysts
take to incorporate information into their forecasts and is calculated using the market model and 12 months of daily
returns prior to the calculation of the implied cost of capital. SFE marks the inclusion of state dummy variables, each
equal to 1 if the firm’s address is located within the state and zero otherwise. We report the p-values, computed using
robust standard errors, in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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1.5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
1.5.1 PLACEBO EVENTS
Since the Lilly Act serves as a one-time shock to employee litigation risk, we perform two
placebo tests to assess whether the relationship between female representation and cumulative
abnormal returns persist for other periods. For these tests, we select April 29, 2009 and July 29,
2009 as our event dates since these are three and six months after the Lilly Act was passed,
respectively. Both panels in Table 9 show that the relationship between 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 and cumulative
abnormal returns is insignificant in the placebo periods. This lends support to our previous findings
by showing that the relationship between female representation and cumulative abnormal returns
does not persist during periods that do not experience sudden shifts in litigation risk based on
employee demographics.
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Table 1.9: Placebo Regressions
Panel A: Three months after the Lilly Act
(1)
-0.0000
Women
(0.7421)
Minority

SFE

-0.0441***
(0.0013)
-0.0042***
(0.0000)
Yes

-0.0002
(0.5838)
-0.0434***
(0.0018)
-0.0043***
(0.0000)
Yes

(3)
-0.0000
(0.8948)
-0.0001
(0.6365)
-0.0435***
(0.0019)
-0.0043***
(0.0000)
Yes

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

2,679
0.0591

2,679
0.0592

2,679
0.0589

Cash Holdings
Log(Assets)

(2)

Panel B: Six months after the Lilly Act
(1)
-0.0000
Women
(0.6677)
Minority

SFE

0.0031
(0.7623)
-0.0042***
(0.0000)
Yes

0.0001
(0.5657)
0.0028
(0.7852)
-0.0042***
(0.0000)
Yes

(3)
-0.0001
(0.5254)
0.0001
(0.4283)
0.0025
(0.8086)
-0.0042***
(0.0000)
Yes

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

2,679
0.0420

2,679
0.0420

2,679
0.0418

Cash Holdings
Log(Assets)

(2)

This table presents the placebo regression results. The dependent variable, CAR, is represented by the three-day
cumulative abnormal returns around April 29, 2009 (Panel A) and July 29, 2009 (Panel B). Women represents the
percentage of women workers employed. Minority represents the percentage of workers belonging to a racial minority.
Cash Holdings represents firm cash holdings scaled by total assets. Log(Assets) represents the natural log of total
assets. SFE marks the inclusion of state dummy variables, each equal to 1 if the firm’s address is located within the
state and zero otherwise. We report the p-values, computed using robust standard errors, in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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1.5.2 HOLDING PERIOD RETURNS
While our cumulative abnormal return results show that firms with low female
representation experience returns below expectation, we also examine the relationship between
female representation and raw returns. First, untabulated summary statistics for holding period
returns show that both the mean (-2.22%) and median (-2.19%) are significantly different from
zero. Then, Table 10 shows that female representation has a relationship with holding period
returns similar to its relationship with cumulative abnormal returns. That is, holding period returns
increase with female representation. A 10% increase in female representation would be associated
with a $10,6669,913 increase in market value based on the three-day holding period return.
Table 1.10: Holding Period Returns Regressions
(1)
0.0003***
Women
(0.0015)
Minority

SFE

0.0332**
(0.0241)
-0.0055***
(0.0000)
Yes

-0.0001
(0.6652)
0.0328**
(0.0269)
-0.0055***
(0.0000)
Yes

(3)
0.0004***
(0.0004)
-0.0004
(0.1066)
0.0349**
(0.0187)
-0.0056***
(0.0000)
Yes

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

2,680
0.0977

2,680
0.0944

2,680
0.0983

Cash Holdings
Log(Assets)

(2)

This table presents the holding period returns regression results. The dependent variable, HPR, is represented by the
three-day holding period return around the passing of The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Women represents
the percentage of women workers employed. Minority represents the percentage of workers belonging to a racial
minority. Cash Holdings represents firm cash holdings scaled by total assets. Log(Assets) represents the natural log of
total assets. SFE marks the inclusion of State dummy variables, each equal to 1 if the firm’s address is located within
the state and zero otherwise. We report the p-values, computed using robust standard errors, in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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1.5.3 PARTITIONING
Although our initial univariate tests for economic channels partition female representation
based on median representation for our subsample of firms with the necessary data for our channel
analyses, we also partition our sample based on the full sample median. The results, shown in
Table 11, are similar to those of Table 6, with both groups experiencing increases in the ICOC and
decreases in expected cash flow. Likewise, Table 11 also shows that the severity of these changes
is less pronounced for firms with higher female representation.
Table 1.11: Univariate Robustness for Full Sample Median
Panel A: Implied cost of capital
Pre
Post
Diff
Mean 0.1258*** 0.1531***
0.0273***
All
Median 0.1156*** 0.1263***
0.0107***
Mean 0.1285*** 0.1388***
0.0103***
High Women
N=416
Median 0.1191*** 0.1264***
0.0073***
Mean 0.1236*** 0.1655***
0.0419**
Low Women
N=387
Median 0.1087*** 0.1258***
0.0171***

p-value
0.0070
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0255
0.0000

Mean Diff
Median Diff
Panel B: Expected cash flow per share dollar
Pre
Post
Mean 0.2630*** 0.1887***
All
Median 0.1059*** 0.0832***
Mean 0.1326*** 0.1184***
High Women
N=204
Median 0.0953*** 0.0882***
Mean 0.3310**
0.2253***
Low Women
N=184
Median 0.1088*** 0.0799***

-0.0316
-0.0098***

0.1198
0.0001

Diff
-0.0743*
-0.0227***
-0.0142***
-0.0071***
-0.1057
-0.0289***

p-value
0.0800
0.0000
0.0008
0.0000
0.1017
0.0000

Mean Diff
Median Diff

0.0915
0.0218***

0.3052
0.0000

This table displays the mean and median implied cost of capital (Panel A) and expected cash flow per share dollar
(Panel B) partitioned into above the median (High) and below the median (Low) groupings based on the percentage
of female employees for our full sample of 2,680 firms. Each variable is also partitioned into pre-Lilly Act (Pre) and
post-Lilly Act (Post) periods. The p-values are calculated using t-scores for differences between means and z-scores
for differences between medians.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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1.5.4 PROFITABILITY MEASURES
We also conduct our analysis with alternative profitability measures, such as expected
earnings per share, scaled by share price, and expected net income, scaled by total assets, in place
of our cash flow measure. The univariate results for these alternative measures, shown in Table
12, align with our results for expected cash flow, suggesting that firms with higher female
representation experience less severe decreases in both expected earnings and net income relative
to firms with low female representation. By the same token, Table 13 shows that in the multivariate
setting, both measures are positively correlated with female representation.
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Table 1.12: Univariate Robustness for Alternative Profitability Measures
Panel A: Expected earnings per share dollar
Pre
Post
Diff
p-value
Mean 0.2939**
0.1791*
-0.1148**
0.0348
All
Median 0.0731*** 0.0449*** -0.0282*** 0.0000
Mean 0.3423
0.2527
-0.0896
0.1473
High Women
N=416
Median 0.0728*** 0.0471*** -0.0257*** 0.0000
Mean 0.2452*
0.1050*** -0.1402
0.1184
Low Women
N=387
Median 0.0731*** 0.0415*** -0.0316*** 0.0000
Mean Diff
Median Diff
Panel B: Expected net income
Pre
Mean 0.0953***
All
Median 0.0781***
Mean 0.0971***
High Women
N=363
Median 0.0804***
Mean 0.0936***
Low Women
N=342
Median 0.0753***

Post
0.0629***
0.0471***
0.0698***
0.0524***
0.0559***
0.0446***

Mean Diff
Median Diff

0.0506
0.0059**

0.6415
0.0380

Diff
-0.0324***
-0.0310***
-0.0273***
-0.0280***
-0.0377***
-0.0307***

p-value
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0104**
0.0027***

0.0131
0.0002

This table displays the mean and median expected earnings per share dollar (Panel A) and net income scaled by total
assets (Panel B), partitioned into above the median (High) and below the median (Low) groupings based on the
percentage of women employees. Each variable is also partitioned into pre-Lilly Act (Pre) and post-Lilly Act (Post)
periods. The p-values are calculated using t-scores for differences between means and z-scores for differences between
medians.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.13: Regression Robustness for Alternative Profitability Measures
Panel A: Change in expected earnings per share dollar
(1)
(2)
0.0004***
Women
(0.0033)
0.0008**
Minority
(0.0128)
-0.0020**
-0.0016
Log(Assets)
(0.0420)
(0.1023)
-0.0064
-0.0081
Leverage
(0.6366)
(0.5567)
-0.0350***
-0.0343***
BTM
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
0.0210**
0.0209**
RunUp
(0.0174)
(0.0149)
SFE
Yes
Yes
Obs
803
0.3185
Adj. R-Squared
Panel B: Change in expected net income
(1)
0.0005***
Women
(0.0000)
Minority
Log(Assets)
Leverage
BTM
RunUp
SFE
Obs
Adj. R-Squared

803
0.3182
(2)

0.0004*
(0.0981)
0.0040***
(0.0001)
0.0437***
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.9465)
0.0029
(0.5990)
Yes

0.0039***
(0.0001)
0.0498***
(0.0000)
0.0003
(0.9285)
0.0065
(0.2386)
Yes
705
0.4344

705
0.4125
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(3)
0.0003**
(0.0225)
0.0005*
(0.0712)
-0.0018*
(0.0773)
-0.0046
(0.7334)
-0.0343***
(0.0000)
0.0225***
(0.0092)
Yes
803
0.3204
(3)
0.0005***
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.8878)
0.0039***
(0.0001)
0.0497***
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.9364)
0.0065
(0.2464)
Yes
705
0.4336

This table presents the change in expected earnings per share dollar (Panel A) and change in expected net income
scaled by total assets (Panel B) regression results around the passing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.
Women represents the percentage of women workers employed. Minority represents the percentage of workers
belonging to a racial minority. Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to
total assets and BTM is the book to market ratio. RunUp is a control for the time analysts take to incorporate
information into their forecasts and is calculated using the market model and 12 months of daily returns prior to the
calculation of the implied cost of capital. SFE marks the inclusion of state dummy variables, each equal to 1 if the
firm’s address is located within the state and zero otherwise. We report the p-values, computed using robust standard
errors, in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

1.6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the market effects of The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.
The Lilly Act, which was passed in an attempt to improve workplace equality and fairness by
addressing compensation discrimination, allows employees to challenge unfair compensation even
if they were not initially aware of the discrimination by renewing the 180-day statute of limitations
each time an employee receives discriminatory compensation. Since the introduction of the Lilly
Act serves as a legislation-based shock to employer litigation risk, and any employee can file a
discrimination claim against their employer, we posit that the market response to the introduction
of the Lilly Act will vary with employee demographics. The relationship between employee
demographics and litigation risk is two-fold. First, ceteris paribus, a firm found guilty of
discriminating against employees based on gender or race will face higher costs if employees
belonging to that demographic make up a larger portion of the firm's employees. Second, higher
costs associated with potential discrimination-based litigation should incentivize firms to reduce,
if not eliminate, discriminatory practices, thereby reducing the ex-ante likelihood of litigation. We
test which of these two forces is more dominant by investigating the abnormal returns around the
introduction of the Lilly Act and find that firms with lower female representation tend to perform
significantly worse than their high female representation counterparts. These differences are both
statistically and economically significant, with low female representation firms earning cumulative
abnormal returns 0.77% lower than high representation firms over a three-day period. This finding
suggests that firms with higher female representation are believed to reduce discriminatory
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practices sufficiently to offset increased litigation risk and costs associated with a larger female
workforce. Although we also see significant differences between firms based on racial minority
representation, these results do not hold for our regression analysis.
Our regression results further support the differential treatment of firms around the
introduction of the Lilly Act based on their female representation, showing that ceteris paribus, a
firm with 10% more female representation can expect a 0.30% larger cumulative abnormal return
around the introduction of the Lilly Act. This is equal to an $8,002,435 difference in market value
over a three-day period for the average firm in our sample. Further investigating the channels
through which this change in value occurs, we find additional differences between high and low
female representation firms when it comes to changes in both the implied cost of capital and
expected cash flow. Our results suggest that firms with low female representation experience a
steeper increase in the cost of capital after the introduction of the Lilly Act compared to firms with
high female representation. Similarly, low female representation firms experience sharper declines
in expected cash flow compared to high female representation firms. The regression results show
that a 10% increase in female representation is associated with a 0.20% smaller increase in the
implied cost of capital and a $0.008 less severe decrease in cash flow per share dollar.
This study contributes to the vast literature on corporate litigation risk by investigating a
market-wide legislative event that increases litigation risk without significantly affecting agency
conflicts. This paper also sheds light on the equality and fairness debate and clarifies the role of
employee demographics in perceived discrimination-based litigation risk by analyzing the firm
value effects of a federal regulation aimed at increasing equality.
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CHAPTER 2: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND LITIGATION RISK: EVIDENCE FROM
THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The extant literature has established that corporate litigation events negatively affect both
firm profitability and valuation (Arena and Julio, 2015; Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998; Karpoff
and Lott, 1993; McTier and Wald, 2011; Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs, 2009; Unsal, 2019; Unsal
and Rayfield, 2019a, 2019b). Further, investors and analysts do not wait for specific litigation
events to occur, but rather, they respond to changes in perceived litigation risk (Devos, Li, and
Tippit, 2022). In this study, we investigate the role that pre-existing employee rights play when
firms experience a sudden increase in perceived litigation risk from employees.
To do this, we explore investor and analyst responses to the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009 (hereafter referred to as the Lilly Act). The Lilly Act increased employee
litigation rights and firms’ perceived employee litigation risk by overturning a previous Supreme
Court ruling, which widened the window during which employees could file discriminatory
compensation claims against the firm. Two benefits to using the passage of the Lilly Act for our
study are that A) the Lilly Act serves as an exogenous shock to firm litigation risk, independent
from a shock to shareholder litigation rights17, and B) the Lilly Act is a federal law that applies to
all US firms simultaneously, eliminating concerns of endogeneity from self-selection bias and
reverse causality.
While the passage of the Lilly Act serves as a market-wide shock to employee litigation
rights, it may not affect all firms’ litigation risk equally. This study focuses on the role that
pre-existing employee rights play in this dynamic. Labor-based investors, including unions,
employee shareholders, and union pension funds, who advocate for employee rights and benefits
have been shown to influence firm decisions in favor of employee welfare at the expense of
17

Shareholder litigation rights are known to affect firm decisions and the cost of capital through changes in agency
conflicts (Houston, Lin, and Xie, 2018; Nguyen, Phan, and Lee, 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018).
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shareholder value (Agrawal, 2012; Arena, Wang, and Yang, 2019; Chyz, Ching Leung, Zhen Li,
and Meng Rui, 2013; Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck, 2006; Leung, Li, and Rui, 2010). This suggests
that pre-existing employee rights influence firm decisions which may have a mediating effect on
changes in litigation risk around the introduction of the Lilly Act.
We first examine the valuation effects for our sample firms around the introduction of the
Lilly Act. The results show that on average, our sample of 779 firms experiences negative
abnormal returns. Given that our sample only includes analyst-covered firms, this result is in line
with findings from both Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005) and Jones and Weingram (1996), which
suggest that larger firms are more likely to be targeted by lawsuits. Further, we find that firms with
more pre-existing employee rights experience lower cumulative abnormal returns over the
three-day period surrounding the passage of the Lilly Act.
This study provides two key contributions to the extant literature. We first improve upon
the extant litigation literature by establishing the role of pre-existing employee rights in moderating
or exacerbating changes in perceived litigation risk. Second, we contribute to the employee rights
literature by providing insight into the effectiveness of unions’ ability to advocate for employee
rights around the introduction of new employee rights legislation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
the Lilly Act. Section 3 describes our data collection and sample selection process. Section 4
presents our results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE LILLY ACT
2.2.1 LITIGATION AND LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Corporate lawsuits are costly events that can lead to increases in both cash holdings and
takeover risk, as well as reductions in profitability, capital expenditures, and cash payouts (Arena
and Julio, 2015; McTier and Wald, 2011; Murphy et al., 2009; Unsal, 2019; Unsal and Rayfield,
2019a, 2019b). Further, lawsuits are associated with various costs, including court fees, potential
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reputational damage, and pulls on management’s resources, so it is no surprise that litigation events
have been found to negatively affect firm performance and valuation (Arena and Ferris, 2017).
Given the various consequences associated with litigation events, it is easy to see how corporate
lawsuits often play a role in various corporate decisions, ranging from equity issuances and capital
structure decisions to firm governance (Arena and Ferris, 2017).
Increases in firm-specific risk, reductions in profitability, and a higher likelihood of being
acquired are a few reasons why the market would likely respond negatively towards increases in
corporate litigation risk. However, the extant literature predominantly focuses on specific litigation
events while overlooking sudden changes in litigation risk (Bhagat et al., 1998; Ellert, 1976;
Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Lowry and Shu, 2002; Malm and Krolikowski, 2017). As expected, the
vast majority of these studies provide evidence that the market responds negatively to a variety of
litigation events (Arena and Ferris, 2017; Bhagat et al., 1998; Karpoff and Lott, 1993). Although
a couple of studies explore the market’s ability to anticipate future lawsuits, they are limited to the
weeks leading up to the case filing date (Gande and Lewis, 2009; Klock, 2015).18
Unlike specific litigation events, legislative shocks allow researchers to analyze the
market’s response to sudden changes in litigation risk regardless of whether a firm experiences a
litigation event following the shock. While some studies have used this characteristic of legislative
shocks to explore the effects of a change in litigation risk, their focus is not on the valuation effects.
The universal demand laws literature provides many examples. Universal demand laws require
shareholders to first seek approval from the board of directors prior to initiating a derivative
lawsuit. While this provides directors with an opportunity to take corrective action, it also greatly
reduces shareholders’ litigation rights since the directors rarely approve shareholders’ requests for
approval (Appel, 2019; Ni and Yin, 2018).19 Since universal demand laws lead to both a decrease
in litigation risk and an increase in agency conflicts, it is difficult to disentangle the valuation

18

The filing date must occur after the accused crime took place.
These requests are rarely approved because directors are often named as defendants in the derivative lawsuits
(Appel, 2019; Ni and Yin, 2018).
19
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effects of these two changes. Instead, most universal demand law studies choose to hone in on the
consequences of increased agency conflicts (Chung, Kim, Rabarison, To, and Wu, 2020; Houston
et al., 2018; Nguyen et al., 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018; Wilson, 2020).
Stepping away from shareholder litigation risk, Devos et al. (2022) examine a legislative
shock to employee litigation rights to better disentangle the valuation effects of a change in
litigation risk and show that increases in litigation risk negatively influence firm value.20 Our study
seeks to build on this literature by examining the mediating effects of pre-existing employee rights
on changes in employee-based litigation risk.
2.2.2 UNIONS AND PRE-EXISTING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Unions are formed to gain and protect workers’ rights, and the degree of these employee
rights influence various firm-level decisions, such as tax aggressiveness, investment decisions, and
the use of unfair labor practices (Agrawal, 2012; Arena, Wang, and Yang, 2019; Chyzet al., 2013;
Faleye et al., 2006; Leung et al., 2010).21 Both Agrawal (2012) and Faleye et al. (2006) find
evidence that labor-based investors, such as union pension funds and employee shareholders,
negatively impact shareholder value in exchange for policies that are more beneficial for
employees. Similarly, unions have been found to influence accounting decisions, pushing
accounting conservatism and waning tax aggressiveness, in order to reduce firm risk and ensure
that the firm can continue to pay out wages and benefits to its employees (Arena et al., 2019; Chyz
et al., 2013; and Leung et al., 2012). It is worth noting that while Arena et al. (2019) look at how
litigation risk influences tax avoidance, including the mediating effects of unions, they focus on
shareholder litigation risk and the governance role of litigation, similar to the universal demand
literature.

20

Since non-executive employees are not a major source of governance, as shareholders are, changes in employee
litigation rights should not have a significant impact on agency conflicts (Gillan, 2006).
21 Employee rights may also be affected by employee shareholders, union-run pension funds, and other labor-based
groups (Agrawal, 2012; Faleye et al., 2006).
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Regarding discriminatory compensation, if unions are successful advocates for employee
rights as indicated by the extant literature, we would expect stronger unions to be associated with
fewer discriminatory practices prior to the introduction of the Lilly Act. However, if unions failed
to persuade firms to eliminate discriminatory behavior beforehand, the passage of the Lilly Act
would provide unions with additional ammunition to use against firms. Under the first situation,
unions would moderate any increases in perceived litigation risk brought about by the Lilly Act,
while under the second situation, they would exacerbate any increases in perceived litigation risk.
2.2.3 LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
In Lilly Ledbetter’s case against her employer, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Goodyear. This ruling specified that while an initial
discriminatory compensation is an act of discrimination, subsequent payments are partly based on
the initial compensation and therefore are not direct acts of discrimination (Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., Inc, 2007). This meant that employees were required to both discover and
file for the discriminatory compensation within 180 days of the initial pay discrimination.
The passage of the Lilly Act, on January 29, 2009, overturned the supreme courts’ decision
from "Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc" (2007), making it so that each paycheck
containing discriminatory compensation is considered to be a separate violation, resetting the
180-day statute of limitations.22 By switching the statute of limitations to a revolving window, the
Lilly Act serves as a legislative shock that increases employee litigation rights across the US,
allowing employees more time to discover, collect evidence against, and file claims for
discriminatory compensation.
From an academic perspective, using the Lilly Act for our study provides many benefits.
First, the Lilly Act’s universal application prevents endogeneity issues from both self-selection
bias and reverse causality. Second, the Lilly Act serves as an exogenous shock to employee
22

The bill passed the Senate with 61 votes (58 required) on January 22 nd, and the House with 250 votes (212
required) on January 27th.
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litigation rights, independent from shock to shareholder litigation rights, which are known to
influence decisions through changes in both agency conflicts and the cost of capital (Houston et
al., 2018; Nguyen et al., 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018).
2.3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION
This study uses union membership data from the Union Membership and Coverage
Database (UMCD) established by Hirsch and MacPherson (2003) along with business segment,
stock return, and financial data from the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) database to analyze the
role of pre-existing employee rights on the valuation effects of the passage of the Lilly Act. Further,
channels through which changes in value may occur are analyzed using analyst forecast data from
the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). Starting with all 6,098 public firms listed in
the CCM database from 2008 through 2009, we eliminate non-domestic firms, firms whose fiscal
year ends in a month other than December or January, and firms with insufficient accounting data,
reducing our sample to 3,041. Next, we require each firm to have a minimum of 70 daily
observations during the estimation period in order to calculate cumulative abnormal returns,
further reducing the sample to 2,774. We then require each firm to be headquartered within the
US, leaving 2,705. The sample is then further reduced to 804 analyst-covered firms. Lastly, we
require that each firm can be linked to the UMCD and remove firms where CCM shows zero
employees, leaving a final sample of 779. Table 1 provides a summary of this sample selection
process.
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Table 2.1: Sample Selection
CRSP/Compustat Merged Firms
Domestic Firms with Share Code 10 or 11
Fiscal Year-End in December or January
All Accounting Data Available
70 or More Estimation Period Observations
Incorporated and Headquartered in the US
Covered by Analyst
Labor not Equal to 0
Union Data Available

6,098
4,774
3,779
3,041
2,774
2,705
804
789
779

This table displays the sample selection process. We begin with all CRSP/Compustat Merged firms from 2008 to
2009. Then we eliminate non-domestic firms and firms whose fiscal years do not end in December or January. To
calculate cumulative abnormal returns and ensure that all of the necessary control variables are available, we remove
firms with incomplete accounting data and firms with fewer than 70 estimation period observations. We then remove
firms that are not both incorporated and headquartered within the US. The sample is then further reduced to
analyst-covered firms. Lastly, we remove firms that report zero employees and/or are not matched to the Union
Membership and Coverage Database.

We use 2008 industry-level union data from the UMCD alongside business segment data
from CCM to calculate firm-level 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 as a proxy for pre-existing employee rights. Since
the UMCD is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) industries, we first match each BLS
industry to a 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit SIC code. Then, assuming the union membership of a
business segment is at industry average, we match each business segment for sample firms to a
BLS industry by the primary SIC code for each segment. This provides a segment-level union
membership rate, which is used alongside CCM data to generate a firm-level measure for union
power. Our 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 measure is based on Hilary (2006) and is calculated as follows:
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖

𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟

𝑖
∗ (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖

(1)

Where k represents each business segment within firm i, 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the percentage of
employees belonging to a union, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is gross sales, 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 is the firm’s number of employees in
thousands, and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is the firm’s total assets in millions.
To study how pre-existing employee rights affect investors’ response to a nationwide
legislative event that increases litigation risk, we observe the market’s three-day cumulative
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abnormal return around the passage of the Lilly Act. Applying a market model with
value-weighted market returns, including dividends, over an estimation period of 𝑡 = −260 to 𝑡 =
−17, where 𝑡 = 0 is the day the Lilly Act was signed into law, January 29th. This window is
selected to capture all trading days from 2008 and exclude trade days from January 200923.
The channels through which value is expected to change are also analyzed by examining
how pre-existing employee rights affect investors’ required rate of return and analysts’ forecasts
for cash flows around the introduction of the Lilly Act. Using Claus and Thomas’ (2001) residual
income-based model, we calculate the implied cost of capital (ICOC) for each firm as a measure
of investors’ required rate of return. To present cash flows on a per-dollar basis, we calculate our
cash flow variable as cash flow per share scaled by the share price.
To safeguard against potential confounding factors, we introduce a variety of firm-level
controls to each of our models. Cash Holdings is firm cash holdings scaled by total assets,
Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets, Analyst Count is the number of analysts following the
firm, Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and BTM is the book-to-market ratio.
We also follow Houston et al. (2018) and Chen, Li, and Zou (2016) by including controls for
idiosyncratic (Idio) and systematic (Beta) risk, as well as price run-up (Run Up) and analyst
optimism (Analyst Opt). Our price run-up measure and both risk measures are estimated using the
market model on daily returns for the twelve months leading up to our ICOC estimation. Analyst
Optimism is equal to the realized 1-year-ahead earnings less the 1-year-ahead analysts’ forecasted
earnings, scaled by the stock price one month prior to the forecast’s announcement date. We
include price run-up as a control for the fact that analyst forecasts may not reflect information as
quickly as the market, which could generate noise for both our ICOC and cash flow variables.
Another potential issue that we control for is analyst optimism. Knowing that analyst forecasts
tend to be optimistic (Dreman and Berry, 1995; Hong and Kubik, 2003), the market may
systemically adjust to compensate for analyst optimism, resulting in upward bias for our

23

The Lilly Act was reintroduced to Congress in early January of 2009.
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accounting-based ICOC measure. By including a control for analyst optimism, we can address this
potential issue.
The descriptive statistics for our sample are shown in Table 2. Both the mean and median
abnormal returns for sample firms, -0.65% and -0.62% respectively, are significantly negative.
Based on Devos et al.’s (2022) findings, this suggests that our sample firms experience larger
increases in perceived litigation risk than the average CCM firm. Further, our mean (median)
ICOC is 15.58% (11.55%), and expected cash flows equal $0.42 ($0.11) per share dollar on
average (median). Firms appear to have roughly 0.3 (0.1) union employees per $1,000,000 in total
assets on average (median). Roughly 65% of our sample firms are located in non-RTW states. The
mean (median) cash holdings for our sample is 9.82% (4.95%) of total assets. Relative to the full
CCM universe, our sample firms are larger.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics

CAR
ICOC
eCF
Union Power
High Union
Non RTW
Cash Holdings
Log(Assets)
Analyst Count
Leverage
BTM
Idio
Beta
Run Up
Analyst Opt

Obs
779
778
464
779
779
779
779
779
779
779
779
779
779
779
779

Mean
-0.0065
0.1258
0.4187
0.0003
0.5006
0.6496
0.0982
7.6926
10.0372
0.2034
0.6840
0.0226
1.0596
-0.1714
-0.0102

St.Dev.
0.0545
0.0858
4.1291
0.0005
0.5003
0.4774
0.1182
1.7679
6.2138
0.1809
0.4677
0.0081
0.3708
0.3931
0.0358

25th
-0.0350
0.0908
0.0748
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0185
6.4246
5.0000
0.0371
0.3683
0.0170
0.7942
-0.3925
-0.0123

Percentiles
50th
75th
0.0190
-0.0062
0.1415
0.1155
0.1481
0.1065
0.0004
0.0001
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.1380
0.0495
8.8236
7.6116
14.0000
9.0000
0.3167
0.1774
0.8943
0.5993
0.0272
0.0216
1.3095
1.0680
0.0525
-0.1487
0.0012
-0.0024

This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. CAR represents the three-day cumulative abnormal returns
around the passing of The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. ICOC is the implied cost of capital, calculated using
Claus and Thomas’ (2001) residual income-based valuation model. eCF is the expected cash flow per share scaled by
the share price. Union Power represents the number of employees belonging to a union (in thousands) per $1 of total
assets. High Union is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s Union Power is above the sample median and
zero otherwise. Non RTW is also an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is not located in a right to work (RTW)
state and zero otherwise. Cash Holdings is firm cash holdings scaled by total assets. Analyst Count is the number of
analysts following the firm in June of 2008. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. BTM is the
book-to-market ratio. Idio and Beta represent unsystematic and systematic risk respectively and are estimated using
the market model on daily returns over the twelve months leading up to ICOC estimation. Run Up is also estimated
using the market model and captures the fact that analysts' forecasts may not incorporate information as quickly as the
market. Analyst Opt equals the difference between the actual 1-year-ahead earnings and 1-year-ahead earnings
forecasts scaled by the stock price one month prior to the forecasts announcement date and controls for bias in analyst
forecasts.

2.4. RESULTS
2.4.1 VALUATION EFFECTS
While our sample firms experience negative abnormal returns around the introduction of
the Lilly Act, we explore whether pre-existing employee rights influence this market response. A
univariate analysis suggests that firms with above the median union power (High) experience
significantly lower CARs compared to firms with below the median union power (Low). Table 3
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shows that this difference is statistically significant, with Low union power firms experiencing
three-day CARs that are 0.94% higher than their High union power counterparts. This difference
seems to be driven by significantly negative CARs for High union power firms, as Low union
power firms do not experience CARs that are significantly different from zero. These results
provide initial evidence that high union power may lead to lower abnormal returns, which is
consistent with the notion that more pre-existing employee rights before the Lilly Act allow
employees to better utilize new legislation that further improves employee rights.
Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
High
(Non RTW)
-0.0112***
Union Power
Mean
-0.0105***
Median
-0.0073***
RTW
Mean
-0.0068***
Median
-0.0068**
Cash Holdings
Mean
-0.0059***
Median
-0.0055**
Log(Assets)
Mean
-0.0054***
Median

Low
(RTW)
-0.0018
-0.0027
-0.0049*
-0.0044*
-0.0062**
-0.0065***
-0.0075***
-0.0072***

Diff.
0.0094**
0.0078***
0.0024
0.0024
0.0006
-0.0013
-0.0020
-0.0018

p-value
0.0162
0.0099
0.5583
0.2057
0.8672
0.9964
0.6215
0.5437

This table displays the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns partitioned into above the median (High) and
below the median (Low) groupings based on the number of union members per $1 of total assets (Union Power), cash
holdings as a percentage of total assets (Cash Holdings), and Log(Assets). Returns are also partitioned based on
whether or not a firm is located in a right to work state (RTW and Non RTW, respectively). The p-values are calculated
using t-scores for differences between means and z-scores for differences between medians.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

A correlation matrix for our sample is shown in Table 4. Although there are several
statistically significant correlations at the 5% level, most of these relationships are only weakly
correlated. There is only one moderate correlation between Total Assets and Idio, with a coefficient
of -0.6056. Since there are no strong correlations between any two independent variables, our
regression results are unlikely to suffer from multicollinearity issues.
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Table 2.4: Correlation Matrix
Variables
(1)
(1) High Union
(2) Non RTW
-0.0717
(3) Cash Holdings
0.0158
(4) Log(Assets)
-0.1970
(5) Analyst Count
-0.0965
(6) Leverage
0.1095
(7) BTM
-0.0712
(8) Idio
0.0300
(9) Beta
0.0389
(10) Run Up
-0.0828
(11) Analyst Opt
0.0599

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.1327
-0.0173
-0.0472
-0.1342
-0.0723
0.0256
0.0113
-0.0508
0.0357

-0.3742
0.0759
-0.3397
-0.2134
0.2917
0.1332
0.0001
0.0814

0.4724
0.1875
0.0311
-0.6056
-0.0349
0.1149
-0.0326

-0.0378
-0.2614
-0.2468
0.0131
0.2078
0.0637

-0.0415
-0.1475
-0.1465
-0.0636
-0.0446

0.1453
0.0916
-0.2951
-0.3183

0.3854
-0.2662
-0.1110

-0.1353
-0.1163

(10)

0.1828

This table reports the correlation matrix for our sample firms. High Union is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s Union Power is above the sample
median and zero otherwise. Non RTW is also an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is not located in a right to work (RTW) state and zero otherwise. Cash
Holdings is firm cash holdings scaled by total assets. Analyst Count is the number of analysts following the firm in June of 2008. Leverage is the ratio of long-term
debt to total assets and BTM is the book to market ratio. Idio and Beta represent idiosyncratic and systematic risk respectively and are each estimated using the
market model over 12 months of daily returns prior to the estimation of the implied cost of capital. Run Up is a control for the time analysts take to incorporate
information into their forecasts and is calculated using the market model and 12 months of daily returns prior to the calculation of the implied cost of capital.
Analyst Opt controls for analyst bias and is calculated as the 1-year-ahead analyst forecast less the 1-year ahead realized earnings, scaled by the stock price one
month prior to the forecast’s announcement date.
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The following ordinary least squares regression model is used for our initial multivariate
tests:

𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑇𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ) +
(2)

𝛽5 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + µ𝑖

Where 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s Union Power is above the
sample median and zero otherwise. Non RTW is also an indicator variable equal to one if the firm
is not located in a right-to-work (RTW) state and zero otherwise. Each of the other variables in
this model is as described previously in Section 3.
Across all four models in Table 5, High Union has a significant negative coefficient,
providing support for our initial findings by showing that more pre-existing employee rights have
a negative impact on abnormal returns around the introduction of the Lilly Act. The results in
column (4) suggest that, on average, firms with above median union power earn three-day
cumulative abnormal returns that are 0.89% lower than firms with below-median union power.
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Table 2.5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Regressions
High Union

(1)
-0.0094**
(0.0162)

(2)
-0.0088**
(0.0214)

-0.0018
(0.5204)

-0.0037
(0.8469)
-0.0007
(0.7106)
0.0009**
(0.0332)
-0.0054
(0.6797)

0.0003
(0.9214)

(4)
-0.0089**
(0.0188)
-0.0025
(0.5130)
-0.0019
(0.9205)
-0.0006
(0.7345)
0.0009**
(0.0374)
-0.0041
(0.7591)

779
0.0061

779
0.0105

779
0.0056

779
0.0097

Non RTW
Cash Holdings
Log(Assets)
Analyst Count
Intercept

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

(3)
-0.0096**
(0.0135)
-0.0031
(0.4165)

This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns regression results. The dependent variable, CAR, is represented
by the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the passing of The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. High
Union is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s Union Power is above the sample median and zero otherwise.
Non RTW is also an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is not located in a right to work (RTW) state and zero
otherwise. Cash Holdings is firm cash holdings scaled by total assets. Log(Assets) represents the natural log of total
assets. Analyst Count is the number of analysts following the firm in June of 2008. We report the p-values, computed
using robust standard errors, in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

2.4.2 ECONOMIC CHANNEL
Now that we have established the role of pre-existing employee rights regarding
cumulative abnormal return regressions in both a univariate and multivariate setting, we next
investigate the channels through which this change in valuation occurs. This is done by exploring
the changes in both the implied cost of capital and expected cash flows around the introduction of
the Lilly Act.24 Beginning with a univariate analysis of these channels, we examine the differences
between pre and post Lilly Act periods for both union power aggregated and disaggregated into
above the median (High) and below the median (Low) groupings.
24 Following Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), we use the median analysts’ forecasts in June while calculating

ICOC to ensure that information from the previous fiscal year is publically available and incorporated into the stock
price at the time of estimation.
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Panel A of Table 6 shows that all groupings experienced increases in their implied cost of
capital following the introduction of the Lilly Act. The average (median) increase in ICOC for
firms with high union power was 1.95% (0.84%), while low union power firms experienced
increases closer to 4.08% (1.47%). Although the differences between these two changes are large,
both a t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggest that they are not statistically significant. The lack
of statistical significance could be due to our limited sample size. We find similar results for
expected cash flows in Panel B of Table 6.25 Both high and low union power firms experienced
decreases in expected cash flows, but once again, comparing the differences between these two
groups are not statistically significant.

25

The expected cash flow sample has 405 observations because 59 of our sample firms do not have expected cash
flow data for 2009.
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Table 2.6: Univariates for Valuation Channels
Panel A: Implied cost of capital
Pre
Mean
0.1258***
All
Median
0.1155***
Mean
0.1280***
High Union
N=389
Median
0.1177***
Mean
0.1236***
Low Union
N=389
Median
0.1121***
Mean Diff
Median Diff
Panel B: Expected cash flow per share
Pre
Mean
0.2596***
All
Median
0.1060***
Mean
0.1681***
High Union
N=203
Median
0.1106***
Mean
0.3516**
Low Union
N=202
Median
0.1013***

Post
0.1560***
0.1263***
0.1475***
0.1261***
0.1644***
0.1268***

Post
0.1851***
0.0822***
0.1400***
0.0854***
0.2305**
0.0777***

Mean Diff
Median Diff

Diff
0.0302***
0.0108***
0.0195***
0.0084***
0.0408**
0.0147***

p-value
0.0037
0.0000
0.0021
0.0000
0.0391
0.0000

-0.0213
-0.0063

0.3038
0.2845

Diff
-0.0745*
-0.0238***
-0.0281***
-0.0252***
-0.1211
-0.0236***

p-value
0.0672
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1371
0.0000

0.0930
-0.0016

0.2522
0.3768

This table displays the mean and median implied cost of capital (Panel A) and expected cash flow (Panel B) partitioned
into above the median (High) and below the median (Low) groupings based on the number of union members per $1
of total assets (Union Power). Each variable is also partitioned into pre-Lilly Act (Pre) and post-Lilly Act (Post)
periods. The p-values are calculated using t-scores for differences between means and z-scores for differences between
medians.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

We use the following ordinary least squares regression models to further investigate the
channels through which changes in valuation occur:

∆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑇𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ) + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + µ𝑖
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(3)

∆𝑒𝐶𝐹𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑇𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ) + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + µ𝑖

(4)

Where ∆𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑖 is the 2008 to 2009 change in the ICOC, based on the residual income-based
valuation model from Claus and Thomas (2001). ∆𝑒𝐶𝐹𝑖 represents the 2008 to 2009 change in
expected cash flows per share scaled by the share price. Each of the independent variables is as
described previously in Section 3.
The models shown in Table 7 provide inconsistent results regarding firm union power.
Columns (1) and (3) suggest that when controls are not included in the model, firms with above
the median union power experience smaller increases in their ICOC, which is not consistent with
the results from Table 5. However, when controls are included in columns (2) and (4), the
coefficients become statistically insignificant. However, the results for NonRTW in column (4) are
still consistent with Table 5, suggesting that firms located in states with higher pre-existing
employee rights experience larger increases in their ICOC. Specifically, column (4) suggests that
firms in states with higher pre-existing employee rights experience a 0.87% larger increase in their
ICOC compared to firms in states with lower pre-existing employee rights. Table 8 on the other
hand shows no significant relationship between either of our pre-existing employee rights variables
and expected cash flows. Although weak, our regression results for ICOC and expected cash flows
suggest that firms with higher pre-existing employee rights lose value through increases in their
ICOC around the introduction of the Lilly Act.
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Table 2.7: Change in Implied Cost of Capital Regressions
(1)
(2)
-0.0057*
-0.0019
High Union
(0.0840)
(0.5489)
Non RTW
Log(Assets)
Analyst Count
Leverage
BTM
Beta
Idio
Run Up
Analyst Opt
Intercept

Obs
Adj. R-Squared

0.0203***
(0.0000)
778
0.0026

0.0031**
(0.0265)
0.0001
(0.8251)
0.0551***
(0.0000)
0.0029
(0.5970)
0.0085*
(0.0710)
0.4977
(0.1118)
0.0469***
(0.0000)
-0.2092**
(0.0351)
-0.0337***
(0.0094)
778
0.2074

(3)
-0.0055*
(0.0955)
0.0024
(0.4987)

0.0186***
(0.0000)
778
0.0019

(4)
-0.0013
(0.6750)
0.0087***
(0.0056)
0.0029**
(0.0357)
0.0001
(0.6241)
0.0587***
(0.0000)
0.0041
(0.4524)
0.0087*
(0.0607)
0.4796
(0.1210)
0.0478***
(0.0000)
-0.2113**
(0.0307)
-0.0401***
(0.0031)
778
0.2143

This table presents the change in the implied cost of capital, ∆ICOC, regression results around the passing of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. High Union is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s Union Power is above
the sample median and zero otherwise. Non RTW is also an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is not located
in a right to work (RTW) state and zero otherwise. Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets. Analyst Count is the
number of analysts following the firm in June of 2008. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and BTM
is the book to market ratio. Idio and Beta represent idiosyncratic and systematic risk respectively and are each
estimated using the market model over 12 months of daily returns prior to the estimation of the implied cost of capital.
Run Up is a control for the time analysts take to incorporate information into their forecasts and is calculated using
the market model and 12 months of daily returns prior to the calculation of the implied cost of capital. Analyst Opt
controls for analyst bias and is calculated as the 1-year-ahead analyst forecast less the 1-year ahead realized earnings,
scaled by the stock price one month prior to the forecast’s announcement date. We report the p-values, computed
using robust standard errors, in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 2.8: Change in Expected Cash Flow Per Share Dollar Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0071
0.0009
0.0075
High Union
(0.3902)
(0.8974)
(0.3711)
0.0061
Non RTW
(0.4769)
0.0035
Log(Assets)
(0.1177)
-0.0021**
Analyst Count
(0.0175)
-0.0686**
Leverage
(0.0306)
-0.0527***
BTM
(0.0026)
-0.0270
Run Up
(0.1697)
-0.0355***
0.0113
-0.0394***
Intercept
(0.0000)
(0.5653)
(0.0000)
Obs
Adj. R-Squared

405
-0.0006

405
0.0731

405
-0.0019

(4)
0.0001
(0.9887)
-0.0114
(0.2436)
0.0039*
(0.0985)
-0.0022**
(0.0148)
-0.0769**
(0.0205)
-0.0560***
(0.0026)
-0.0290
(0.1589)
0.0214
(0.3276)
405
0.0748

This table presents the change in expected cash flow, ∆eCF, regression results around the passing of the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009. High Union is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s Union Power is above the sample
median and zero otherwise. Non RTW is also an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is not located in a right to
work (RTW) state and zero otherwise. Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets. Analyst Count is the number of
analysts following the firm in June of 2008. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and BTM is the book
to market ratio. Run Up is a control for the time analysts take to incorporate information into their forecasts and is
calculated using the market model and 12 months of daily returns prior to the calculation of the implied cost of capital.
We report the p-values, computed using robust standard errors, in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

2.5. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the role of pre-existing employee rights on the market effects of the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. The Lilly Act served as a legislation-based shock to employer
litigation risk by altering the statute of limitations during which employees can challenge
discriminatory compensation. By modifying the previous statute of limitations so that the 180-day
window renews with each act of discriminatory compensation, the Lilly Act effectively lead to an
increase in employer litigation risk from employees. Although the introduction of the Lilly Act
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increases all employees’ litigation rights, we posit that pre-existing employee rights may have a
mediating effect on employees’ ability to utilize the rights gained from the Lilly Act. The potential
role of pre-existing employee rights is two-fold. On the one hand, strong pre-existing employee
rights could provide employees with enough power to barter for fair conditions without the need
for the Lilly Act’s extended statute of limitation. On the other hand, if employees failed to barter
for fair conditions prior to the Lilly Act, stronger pre-existing employee rights would provide
employees with a better foundation to sue their firm once the Lilly Act is passed. Our analysis of
the abnormal returns around the introduction of the Lilly Act provides insight into which of these
two effects is more dominant. Our results suggest that firms with stronger pre-existing employee
rights tend to perform significantly worse than firms with weaker pre-existing employee rights.
These differences are both statistically and economically significant, with stronger pre-existing
employee rights firms earning cumulative abnormal returns 0.94% lower than weaker pre-existing
employee rights firms over a three-day period. This finding suggests that stronger pre-existing
employee rights allow employees to better leverage the Lilly Act to sue their employers.
The concept of stronger pre-existing employee rights exacerbating the negative valuation
effects of the Lilly Act is further supported by our regression results. Ceteris paribus, a firm with
above the median union power is expected to experience a 0.89% smaller cumulative abnormal
return around the introduction of the Lilly Act. Further investigating the channels through which
this change in value occurs, we find weak evidence suggesting that firms located in states with
stronger pre-existing employee rights tend to experience larger increases in their implied cost of
capital. Our regression analysis suggests that firms located in non-right-to-work states experienced
a 0.87% sharper increase in their implied cost of capital after the introduction of the Lilly Act. We
did not find any significant relationship between pre-existing employee rights and changes in
expected cash flows.
This study contributes to both the literature on employee rights and corporate litigation risk
by exploring the moderating effects of pre-existing employee rights on changes in perceived
litigation risk. This provides insight into both the initial ability of unions to advocate for employee
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rights and the subsequent mediation effects of said attempts on perceived litigation risk around the
introduction of additional employee rights via new legislation.
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